Islamic law (Sharia) and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by Badar, Mohamed
Citation: Badar, Mohamed (2011) Islamic law (Sharia) and the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court. Leiden Journal of International Law, 24 (2). pp. 411-433. ISSN 0922-1565 
Published by: Cambridge University Press
URL:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0922156511000082 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0922156511000082>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/13566/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to  third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
Leiden Journal of International Law, 24 (2011), pp. 411–433
C© Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law doi:10.1017/S0922156511000082
Islamic Law (Shari’a) and the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court
MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR∗
Abstract
Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been mostly hailed as a victory, Islamic
states still regard its application of international criminal-law norms with scepticism. The
Rome Statute instructs the Court to apply general principles of law derived fromnational laws
of legal systems of the world including the national laws of states that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime but, so far, the Court has relied purely upon Western inspiration
andmay fail to acquire the legitimacy to establish a universal system.Among the legal systems
that are unjustiﬁably neglected by the ICC is the Islamic legal tradition. This paper argues that
the principles of Islamic law are, for the most part, consistent with internationally recognized
norms and standards, particularly those enshrined in the Rome Statute, and are on an equal
footing with the common and Continental legal systems that are currently employed by the
Court in the search for general principles of law.
Keywords
duress (ikrah); Islamic jurisprudence (ﬁqh); Islamic law (Shari’a); Islamic legal maxims
(al-Qawa¯’id al-Fiqhı¯yah); mens rea; presumption of innocence; principle of legality; superior
orders
The time has come, perhaps, to discard or limit the visionary goal of ‘one law’ or ‘one
code’ for thewhole world and to substitute for it themore realistic aim of crystallizing
a common core of legal principles.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Numerous scholars have debated the formation, functioning, and practice of the
International Criminal Court (ICC). One of the most contentious of these debates
is on the issue of the general principles of law that can be applied by the Court in
various cases. During the Rome negotiations, Islamic states supported the existence
of an international criminal-justice institution. However, they also viewed it with
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1 R. B. Schlesinger, ‘Research on the General Principles of LawRecognized by CivilizedNations’, (1957) 51 AJIL
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suspicion and showed reluctance in ratifying the statute, because of the selectivity
of the Court in the application of principles of criminal law.2
It has been noted by scholars that there is a tendency towards viewing Islamic
law as a static or non-progressive legal system, whose main principles are derived
from religious texts.3 Most Western scholarly debates centre on Islamic criminal
law on a basic level without an in-depth grasp of the subject. This has been thought
to be due to a lacuna in the available English literature on Islamic criminal law that
‘cries to be ﬁlled’.4 It has also been argued that it is almost impossible for Islamic
law to be compared to theWestern legal system, because the legal systems of almost
all Islamic states are based on the principles of Shari’a, making the path to the
creation of a dialogue between Islamic law and international institutions virtually
non-progressive.5
The aim of this paper is to ﬁnd out whether it is viable for the ICC to adopt prin-
ciples of international criminal law from the Islamic legal system. As it is obviously
impossible tocovereveryaspectof Islamic lawand its counterpart in the ICCStatute,
the scope of this paper is limited to some fundamental principles of Islamic criminal
law and its compatibility with international criminal-law principles, namely the
principle of legality, the presumption of innocence, the concept ofmens rea, and the
standards used by Muslim jurists for determining intention in murder cases. Other
general defences such as duress and superior orders are also included in this paper.
To achieve its purpose, the second and third parts of this paper examine in detail
thesourcesof Islamic law,categoriesofcrimes, the leadingschoolsof Islamicthought
(madha¯hib), and Islamic legal maxims (al-Qawa¯’id al-Fiqhı¯yah).
2. ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A)
Islamic law (Shari’a) has its roots deeply embedded in the political, legal, and social
aspects of all Islamic states and it is the governing factor of all Islamic nations.6 It is
often described by bothMuslims and Orientalists as themost typical manifestation
of the Islamic way of life – the core and kernel of Islam itself.7 Other commentators
deem this an exaggeration and do not believe Islam was meant to be as much
of a law-based religion as it has often been made out to be.8 In any case, Islamic
2 J. C. Ochoa, ‘The Settlement of Disputes Concerning States Arising from the Application of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Balancing Sovereignty and the Need for an Effective and Independent ICC’,
(2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 3.
3 M. J. Kelly, ‘Islam and International Criminal Law: A Brief (In)Compatibility Study’, (2010) Pace International
Law Review Online Companion, available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilronline/8.
4 M. H. Kamali, ‘Legal Maxims and Other Genres of Literature in Islamic Jurisprudence’, (2006) 20 Arab Law
Quarterly 77; G. Badr, ‘Islamic Law: Its Relationship to Other Legal Systems’, (1978) 26 American Journal of
Comparative Law 187.
5 M. Zahraa, ‘Characteristic Features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconceptions’, (2000) 15 Arab Law
Quarterly 168; see also D. Westbrook, ‘Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate
Expressions ofWorld Order’, (1993) 33 Virg. JIL 819.
6 H. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (1982); A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–1939
(1983); W. B. Hallaq,AHistory of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul-al Fiqh (1997).
7 J. Schacht,An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964), 1.
8 M. H. Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction (2008), 1.
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law, one of the recognized legal systems of the world,9 is a particularly instructive
example of a ‘sacred law’ and differs from other systems so signiﬁcantly that its
study is indispensable in order to appreciate adequately the full range of possible
legal phenomena.10
Islamic law, like Roman law, used to be a ‘jurist law’, in the sense that it was a
product of neither legislative authority nor case law, but a creation of the classical
jurists, who elaborated on the sacred texts.11 However, with the ﬁrst codiﬁcations in
the mid-nineteenth century, Islamic law became ‘statutory law’, promulgated by a
national territorial legislature.12
It is no secret that most Islamic nations are viewed as being non-progressive,
especially with respect to their national legal systems and implementation of crim-
inal laws.13 On the other hand, the Islamic states view the West and East as being
unethical, immoral, and unduly biased towards the religious, cultural, and political
aspects of Islam itself.14
2.1. The application of Islamic law inMuslim states today
Modern Islamic society is divided into sovereign nation states. Today, there are
57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is
considered the second-largest inter-governmental organization after the United
Nations.15 The organization claims to be the collective voice of the Muslim world
and aims to safeguard and protect its interests.16 Most states who joined the OIC
are predominantly Sunni, with only Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Lebanon
having a predominantly Shi’a population. Apart from Lebanon and Syria, all Arab
states consider Islam the state religion and the source of law.17
ProfessorBassiounidividesthesecountries intothreecategories.Theﬁrstcategory
comprises secular states, like Turkey or Tunisia, who, despite theirmoral or cultural
connection with Islam, do not subject their laws to the Shari’a. Countries from the
second category, such as Iraq and Egypt, expressly state in their constitutions that
9 See R. David and J. Brierly,Major Legal Systems in theWorld Today (1978), 421.
10 Schacht, supra note 7, at 2.
11 A. Layish, ‘The Transformation of the Shari’a from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law’, (2004) 44DieWelt des Islams
85, at 86; see also F. A. Hassan, ‘The Sources of Islamic Law’, (1982) 76 ASIL Proc. 65, at 65.
12 Layish, ibid.
13 J. L. Esposito, ‘The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?’, in J. Rehman et al. (eds.), Religion, Human Rights and
International Law: A Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices (2007), 5; see also J. Rehman, Islamic State
Practices, International Lawand the Threat fromTerrorism: ACritique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in theNewWorld
Order (2005).
14 J. Gathii, ‘The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal
Theory’, (2000) 41 Harv. ILJ 263; S. S. Ali and J. Rehman, ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law’,
(2005) 10 JCSL 321; M. A. Boisard, ‘On the Probable Inﬂuence of Islam onWestern Public and International
Law’, (1980) 11 International Journal of Middle East Studies 429.
15 This number includes Palestine, which is not yet considered a state under international law. For more
information on the OIC, see www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52.
16 In 2004, the OIC made submissions on behalf of Muslim states regarding proposed reforms of the UN
Security Council to the effect that ‘any reform proposal, which neglects the adequate representation of the
Islamic Ummah in any category of members in an expanded Security Council will not be acceptable to the
Islamic coutries’; see UNDoc. A/59/425/S/2004/808 (11 October 2004), para. 56, quoted inM. A. Baderin (ed.),
International Law and Islamic Law (2008), xv.
17 C. B. Lombardi, ‘Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization of the
Shari’a in aModern Arab State’, (1998) 37 Col. JTL 81.
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their laws are to be subject to the Shari’a; therefore, their constitutional courts de-
cide on whether a given law is in conformity with the Shari’a and can also review
the manner in which other national courts interpret and apply the laws to ensure
conformity.18 The third category of states proclaims the direct applicability of the
Shari’a. According to one commentator, the majority of Muslim states fall between
the two poles of ‘purist’ Saudi Arabia and ‘secular’ Turkey.19 Most states have been
selective indeterminingwhichShari’a rules apply to their national legislations.20As
a consequence of colonialism and the adoption of Western codes, Shari’a was abol-
ished in the criminal lawof someMuslimcountries in thenineteenth and twentieth
centuries but has made a comeback in recent years, with countries like Iran, Libya,
Pakistan, Sudan, andMuslim-dominated northern states of Nigeria reintroducing it
in place ofWestern criminal codes.21
2.2. Sources of Islamic law: Shari’a and Fiqh
Islam is a way of life akin to a system that regulates the believer’s life and thoughts
in line with a certain set of rules.22 The term ‘Islamic law’ covers the entire system
of law and jurisprudence associatedwith the religion of Islam. It can be divided into
two parts, namely the primary sources of law (Shari’a in the strict legal sense) and
the subordinate sources of lawwith themethodology used to deduce and apply the
law (Islamic jurisprudence or ﬁqh).23
Shari’a literallymeans ‘the pathway’24 and, in its original usage, itmeant the road
to the watering place or path leading to the water, that is, the way to the source
of life.25 It rules and regulates all public and private behaviour as well as legal
aspects.26 Theword Shari’a occurs once in theQur’a¯n: ‘Thus we put you on the right
way [sharı¯’atan] of religion. So follow it and follow not the whimsical desire (hawa¯)
of those who have no knowledge’ (Qur’a¯n, 45:18).
Shari’a is derived directly from the Qur’a¯n and the Sunnah, which are considered
byMuslims to be of divine revelation and thus create the immutable part of Islamic
law, while ﬁqh is mainly the product of human reason. ‘Muslim jurists throughout
history have not been concerned with establishing a particular ﬁeld or science or
even theory – to them the divine sources are comprehensive enough to encompass
any possible human action, conduct or transaction.’27 However, it is important to
mention that in contrast to the belief of the Sunni, the Shi’a believe that divine
18 M. C. Bassiouni, The Shari’a and Post-Conﬂict Justice (2010), 15 (on ﬁle with the author).
19 J. Esoisutim, ‘Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution? ’, in J. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford History of
Islam (1999), 643.
20 H. Hamoudi, ‘The Death of Islamic Law’, (2009) 38 Georgia JICL 316, at 325.
21 R. Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (2007), 124.
22 M. Khadduri, ‘TheModern Law of Nations’, (1956) 50 AJIL 358.
23 M. A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (2005), 32–4. Some scholars use the terms ‘Islamic
law’,Shari’a, and/orﬁqh interchangably. For example,Kamali considersShari’a to also includeﬁqh; seeKamali,
supra note 8.
24 A. Rahim, The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1994), 389.
25 F. Robinson,Atlas of the IslamicWorld since 1500 (1982), 320.
26 A. S. Alareﬁ, ‘Overview of Islamic Law’, (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 707, at 707–8; Schacht,
supra note 7, at 1–5.
27 Zahraa, supra note 5, at 171.
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revelation continued to be transmitted after the Prophet’s death to the line of their
recognized religious leaders (imams).28 They thus consider as part of the divine
revelation the pronouncements of their imams, whom they believe infallible.29
2.2.1. Qur’a¯n
The Qur’a¯n is considered by Muslims to be the embodiment of the words of God as
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad through Angel Gabriel. It is the chief source
of Islamic law and the root of all other sources.30 However, it is far from being a
textbookof jurisprudence and is rather a bookof guidance on all aspects of the life of
everyMuslim:31 ‘We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a Guide,
a Mercy, and Glad Tidings toMuslims’ (Qur’a¯n, 16:89).
TheQur’a¯n consists ofmore than6000verses (ayat).32 Jurists differ on thenumber
ofversesthatareof legalsubjectmatter,as theyusedifferentmethodsofclassiﬁcation
for determining what constitutes a legal verse – estimates range from 80 up to
800 verses.33 The legal verses are not accumulated in their own separate chapter
(sura), but may occur alongside verses about belief, general behaviour, the nature
of existence, or the history of bygone peoples. A particular judgment may occur on
a number of different occasions and in different styles to deepen and broaden the
understanding of the believer while reminding him of the rule.34
TheQur’a¯n is an indivisiblewhole andaguide thatmust be accepted and followed
in its entirety.35 It was revealed, a few verses at a time, over a period of 23 years,
ending with the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. To properly understand its
legislation,onehastotakeintoconsiderationtheSunnahaswellas thecircumstances
and the context of the time of the revelation.
2.2.2. Sunnah
According to the common understanding ofMuslims, the second sources of Islamic
law are the sayings and practice of the ProphetMuhammad or the Sunnah, collected
inhadı¯ths.36While theQur’a¯n isbelieved tobeofmanifest revelation–that is, that the
verywords ofGodwere conveyed to the ProphetMuhammadby theAngelGabriel –
the Sunnah falls into the category of internal revelation, that is, it is believed that
God inspiredMuhammad and the latter conveyed the concepts in his ownwords.37
The Sunnah is complementary to the Qur’a¯n as a source for knowing the
divine will, which is explicitly stated in the Qur’a¯n itself: ‘And what the
28 Kamali, supra note 8, at 88.
29 Ibid.
30 Alareﬁ, supra note 26, at 709–10.
31 M. S. El-Awa, ‘Approaches to Shari’a: A Response to N. J. Coulson’s A History of Islamic Law’, (1991) 2 Journal
of Islamic Studies 143, at 146.
32 6239 verses (Bassiouni, supra note 18); 6235 verses (Kamali, supra note 8); 6666 (I. Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law:
An Overview of Its Origin and Elements’, (2002) 7 Islamic Law and Culture 27).
33 There are 80 legal verses according to Coulson (infra note 57), 120 according to Bassiouni (supra note 18),
350 according to Kamali (supra note 8), 500 according to Ghazali, and 800 according to Ibn Al-Arabi, while,
according to Shawkani, any calclulation can only amount to a rough estimate.
34 El-Awa, supra note 31, at 146.
35 Kamali, supra note 8, at 22.
36 El-Awa, supra note 31, at 153.
37 Kamali, supra note 8, at 18.
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Messenger gives you, take; and what he has forbidden you, leave alone’ (Qur’a¯n,
59:7).
The Qur’a¯n authorizes the Prophet Muhammad to make legal decisions in re-
sponse to developments in theMuslim community and delegates to him the task of
explaining the judgements of theQur’a¯n:38
Judge between them according to what God has revealed, and do not follow them in
their vain desires.’ Qur’a¯n (5:49); ‘No, by your Lord, they are not (truly) believers until
theymake you the judge of the disputes that arise among them, and ﬁnd no resistance
in their- selves to what you decide but accept (it) with complete submission. (Qur’a¯n,
4:65)
2.2.3. Fiqh
When an issue is not speciﬁcally addressed in either the Qur’a¯n or the Sunnah, the
Prophet mandated the use of sound reasoning in reaching a judgment.39 When
appointing a judge to Yemen, the Prophet asked him:
According to what shalt thou judge? He replied: According to the Book of Allah. And
if thou ﬁndest nought therein? According to the Sunnah of the Prophet of Allah. And
if thou ﬁndest nought therein? Then I will exert myself to form my own judgement.
[The Prophet replied] Praise be to GodWho had guided the messenger of His Prophet
to that which pleases His Prophet.40
This concept of exerting one’s reasoning in determining a matter of law is called
ijtihad and it is the essence of u¯su¯l al-ﬁqh, a legal method of ranking the sources of
law, their interaction, interpretation, and application.41 The result of this method is
ﬁqh, which literally means human understanding and knowledge in deducing and
applying the prescriptions of the Shari’a in real or hypothetical cases.42 As such, it
does not command the same authority as does the Shari’a and it is the subject of
different Sunni and Shi’a scholarly andmethodological approaches.43
In the formative period of Islamic law, the science of u¯su¯l al-ﬁqh did not yet exist
as a separate branch of intellectual endeavour and no ﬁxed hierarchy of sourceswas
adopted.44 Later, however, it became almost universally recognized that the Qur’a¯n
has primacy over the Sunnah, followed by the two main proofs of law attained
through human reasoning, namely ijma¯’ and qiyas.
2.2.3.1. Consensus by collective reasoning (ijma¯’). When theQur’a¯n and the Sunnah do
notprovide ananswer onan issue, learned jurists are to reacha consensus of opinion
(ijma¯’) – a practice established by the companions of the Prophet (Sahaba).45 Ijma¯’
is a rational proof of Shari’a and, because of its binding nature, it requires that the
38 El-Awa, supra note 31, at 147.
39 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 32, at 35.
40 S. Rammadan, Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity (1970), 75.
41 M. H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (2006), 469.
42 Kamali, supra note 8, at 40–1.
43 Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 10.
44 J. E. Brockopp, ‘Competing Theories of Authority in Early Maliki Texts’, in B. G.Weiss (ed.), Studies in Islamic
Legal Theories (2002), 3.
45 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 32, at 55.
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consensus be absolute and universal; however, in practice, it has often been claimed
also for rulings on which only a majority consensus existed.46
2.2.3.2. Analogical deduction by individual reasoning (qiyas).47 Qiyas is the extension
of Shari’a value or ruling fromanoriginal case to anewcase, not found in theQur’a¯n,
the Sunnah, or a deﬁnite ijma¯’, because the new case has the same effective cause as
the original one.48 An example of qiyas is the extension of the prohibition of wine
to a prohibition of any drug that causes intoxication, because the prevention of the
latter is the effective purpose of the original prohibition.49
Other methods include istihsa¯n (equity in Islamic law), maslahah mursalah (con-
siderations of public interest), ’urf (custom), istisha¯b (presumption of continuity),
and ijtiha¯d (personal reasoning).50
2.3. Categories of crime in Islamic criminal law
In Islamic law,offenceshavebeendivided into threecategoriesaccording tocomplex
criteria that combine the gravity of the penalty prescribed, the manner and the
method used in incriminating and punishing, and the nature of the interest affected
by the prohibited act.51
The ﬁrst category is hudu¯d crimes. These crimes are penalized by the community
and punishable by ﬁxed penalties as required in the Qur’a¯n and the Sunnah.52 Both
crime and punishment are precisely determinedwith some ﬂexibility for the judge,
depending upon the intent of the accused and the quality of the evidence.53 Mostly,
there are seven recognized hudu¯d crimes: ridda (apostasy); baghi (transgression);
sariqa (theft); haraba (highway robbery); zena (illicit sexual relationship); qadhf
(slander); and shorb al-khamr (drinking alcohol).54 It has been argued that these
matters cover themost vital areas of collective life (in the followingorder of priority:
religion, life, family, intellect, wealth)55 and require collective commitment to these
values as law.56 In these offences, it is the notion of Man’s obligation to God rather
than to his fellow man that predominates.57 The state owes the right to Allah to
implement the hudu¯d.58
Opinions vary onwhich crimes are to be considered hudu¯d. For theMaliki school
of law, there are two different sets of hudu¯d offences.Mawardi (Shaﬁ’i school) claims
46 Ibid., at 228–9.
47 ‘Refutations of the validity of qiyas are to be found in Imami Shi’i collections of reports, all available Shi’i
works of u¯su¯l al-ﬁqh, polemics against Sunni thought and not infrequently in works of furu al-ﬁqh’: R. M.
Gleave, ‘Imami Shi’i Refutations of Qiyas’, inWeiss, supra note 44, at 267.
48 Kamali, supra note 41, at 264. The ulama (Muslim jurists) are in unanimous agreement that the Qur’a¯n and
the Sunnah constitute the sources of the original case, but there is some disagreement as to whether ijma¯’
constitutes a valid source for qiyas; see Kamali, ibid., at 268.
49 Ibid., at 267.
50 Ibid.
51 S. Nagaty, The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law: Shari’a (1991), 50.
52 A. Mansour, ‘Hudud Crimes’, in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), The Islamic Criminal Justice System (1982), 195.
53 Kamali, supra note 8, at 161.
54 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Crimes and the Criminal Process’, (1997) 12Arab Law Quarterly 269.
55 I. A. K. Nyazee,General Principles of Criminal Law: Islamic andWestern (2000), 28.
56 El-Awa, supra note 31, at 157.
57 N. J. Coulson,AHistory of Islamic Law (1964), 124.
58 Nyazee, supra note 55, at 18.
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there are four hudu¯d offences: adultery, theft, drunkenness, and defamation, while
Ibn Rushid and Al Gazali (Shaﬁ’i school) claim there are seven: apostasy, rebellion,
adultery, theft, highway robbery, drunkenness, and defamation.59
The second category consists of qisa¯s and diyya crimes. In Islamic law, the pun-
ishment prescribed for murder and the inﬂiction of injury is named qisa¯s, that
is, inﬂicting on the culprit an injury exactly equal to the injury he/she inﬂicted
upon his/her victim. The right to demand retribution or compensation lies with the
victim or, in cases of homicide, the victim’s next of kin.60 Sometimes, the relation-
ship between this person and the offender can prevent retaliation.61 Qisa¯s and diyya
crimes fall into two categories: homicide andbattery.62 These crimes are thus treated
in Islamic law as private, not public, offences.63
The third category of crimes in Islamic law is called ta’azir crimes. These crimes
are punishable by penalties left to the discretion of the ruler or the judge (qadi).
They are not speciﬁed by the Qur’a¯n or Sunnah; any act that infringes private or
community interests of the public order can be subject to ta’azir.64 It is the duty
of public authorities to lay down rules penalizing such conduct. These rules must,
however,drawtheir inspirationfromtheShari’a.65Anexampleofa ta’azircrimeisthe
trafﬁcking of persons. It is not deﬁned in theQur’a¯n or the Sunnah but it constitutes
a clear violation of the right to personal security, one of the ﬁve essentials of Islam.66
Ta’azir is used for three types of cases:
1. Criminal acts which must by their very nature be sanctioned by penalties which
relate to hudu¯d, for example attempted adultery, illicit cohabitation, or simple
robbery;
2. Criminal acts normally punished by hudu¯d, but where by reason of doubt, for pro-
cedural reasons, or because of the situation of the accused, the hudu¯d punishment
is replaced by ta’azir;
3. All acts under the provisions of the law, which are not punished by hudu¯d.67
2.4. The leading schools of law (madha¯hib)
Scholars tracing their doctrine to the same early authority regarded themselves as
followers of the same school. Early interest in law evolved where men learned in
the Qur’a¯n began discussions of legal issues and assumed the role of teachers.68
At ﬁrst, students rarely restricted themselves to one teacher and it only became the
59 B.Al-Muhairi, ‘The Islamisationof Laws in theUAE:TheCaseof thePenalCode’, (1996) 11ArabLawQuarterly
363.
60 Rules establishing the next of kin vary according to different schools; see Peters, supra note 21, at 45.
61 Ibid., at 48.
62 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Quesas Crimes’, in Bassiouni, supra note 52, at 203.
63 Coulson, supra note 57, at 124.
64 G. Benmelha, ‘Ta’azir Crimes’, in Bassiouni, supra note 52, at 213.
65 Ibid., at 213.
66 UNDOC, Combating Trafﬁcking in Persons in Accordance with the Principles of Islamic Law,
45, available at www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafﬁcking/Islamic_Law_TIP_E_ebook_18_March_
2010_V0985841.pdf.
67 Benmelha, supra note 64, at 213–14.
68 W. B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005), 153.
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normativepractice in the secondhalf of theninthcentury for jurists to adopt a single
doctrine.69Whenprominent jurists70begantohaveloyal followerswhowouldapply
exclusively their doctrine in courts of law, the so-called ‘personal schools’ emerged
and only a few of these leaders were raised to the level of founder of a ‘doctrinal
school’, what is referred to in Islamic law as the madhha¯b.71 When they emerged,
the doctrinal schools did not remain limited to the individual doctrine of a single
jurist, butpossessed a cumulativedoctrine inwhich the legal opinionsof the leading
jurists were, at best, primi inter pares.72
The four Sunni schools are the Hanaﬁ, named after Imam Abu Hanifa, the Ma-
liki, named after Imam Malik, the Shafe’i, named after Imam Al Shafe’i, and the
Hanbali, named after Imam Ibn Hanbal. Out of these schools, the Hanaﬁ school
was geographically the most widespread and, for much of Islamic history, the most
politically puissant. The Shi’a schools are the Twelvers, the Isma’ili, and the Zaydi.73
Out of these, the Twelvers are the best known and have the largest percentage in
Iran and Iraq.74
It is hard to ﬁnd consensus among the various schools and sub-schools; however,
some consensus can be found among the four Sunni schools and some consensus
among the four Shi’a schools. The difference in the rules for interpreting theQur’a¯n
is the fundamental element that separates themadha¯hib from one another.75 While
there is no question that the Qur’a¯n is the ﬁrst source of the Shari’a, followed by
the Sunnah, there are differences among the schools as to the ranking of the other
sources of law.
In order to create greater legal certainty, rulers could direct the judge (qadi) they
appointed to follow one school.76 This was the practice of Ottoman sultans, while
Saudi kings left their qadi totally free in choosing the madhha¯b and opinions for
deciding cases, as there is a strong sense of independence among the religious
scholars stafﬁng the courts, based on their view that the realm of the ﬁqh is their
prerogative and the state should not interfere.77
While, today, there is a general understanding in Islamic republics that the law
has to comply with the Shari’a, the concurrence of legislation with the whole body
of Islamic law, including Islamic jurisprudence (ﬁqh), and the doctrine of a particular
school of Islamic law is not always included.78 An example can be derived from the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which states that ‘All existing laws
shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the
Holy Quran and Sunnah’. Similarly, the Afghanistan Constitution declares that ‘no
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. Those jurists are Abu Hanifa, Ibn Abi Layla, Abu Yusuf, Shaybani, Malik, Awza’i, Thawri, and Shaﬁ’i.
71 Ibid., at 157.
72 Ibid., at 156.
73 Ibid.
74 Bassiouni, supra note 18.
75 Rahim, supra note 24, at 73–110.
76 Peters, supra note 21, at 6.
77 Ibid. Nevertheless, Saudi qadis, as a rule, follow the Hanbali School.
78 R. Moschtaghi, Max Planck Manual on Afghan Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Structure and Principles of the State
(2009), at 31.
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law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam’, but restricts the application of
the Hanaﬁ jurisprudence in Article 130 only to cases ‘when there is no provision in
the Constitution or other laws regarding the ruling on an issue’. In Saudi Arabia,
on the other hand, Hanbali legal rules constitute the laws of the kingdom.79 In
Iran, the constitution states that laws and regulations must be based on Islamic
criteria, which, in practice, is covered by the Shari’a, ﬁqh, and fatwa, and by the
doctrine of the Ja’fari fraction of Islam.80
3. ISLAMIC LEGAL MAXIMS (AL-QAWA¯’ID AL-FIQHI¯YAH)
Inpublic international law, ‘maximsof law’ are viewedas synonymouswith ‘general
principles of law’.81 Similarly, in Western legal traditions, maxims play a vital role
in the process of judgment. The signiﬁcance and the role of legalmaxims inWestern
law are observed as follows: ‘A general principle; a leading truth so called, quia
maxima est eius dignitas et certissima auctoritas atque quod maxime omnibus probetur –
because its dignity is the greatest and its authority themost certain, and because it is
universally approved by all.’82 For instance, by the time of Coke,83 the maxim actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea84 (an act does notmake a person guilty unless hismind
is guilty) had become well ingrained in the common law.
‘Legal maxims’ (al-qawa¯’id al-ﬁqhı¯yah) is a term applied to a particular science in
Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic legal maxims, similar to theirWestern counterparts,
are theoretical abstractions in the form, usually, of short epithetic statements that
are expressive of the nature and sources of Islamic law and encompass general rules
in cases that fall under their subject.85 They are different from u¯su¯l al-ﬁqh (roots and
sources of Islamic jurisprudence) in that themaxims are based on the ﬁqh itself and
represent rules and principles that are derived from the reading of the detailed rules
of ﬁqh on various themes.86 One of the main functions of the Islamic legal maxims
is to depict the general picture of goals and objectives of the Islamic law (maqa¯sid
al-Sharı¯’ah).87 Today, legal maxims become ‘sine qua non for any Islamic jurist and
79 S. Mahmoudi, ‘The Sharia in the New Afghan Constitution: Contradiction or Compliment?’, (2004), 868,
available atwww.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/mahmoudi,_the_shari%27a_in_the_new_afghan_constitution_
contradiction_or_compliment.pdf.
80 Ibid., at 871.
81 Asnoted by the English jurist Lord Phillimore in the Proceedings of theAdvisoryCommittee of Jurists, 16 June–24
July 1920, in Proces-verbaux, 335, quoted in F. F. Jalet, ‘TheQuest for theGeneral Principles of LawRecognized
by Civilized Nations: A Study’, (1963) 10University of California, Los Angeles Law Review 1041, at 1046.
82 J. Early and C. Walsh, Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Vol. 2 (1977), at 1164, quoted in L. Zakariyah,
‘Applications of Legal Maxims in Islamic Criminal Law with Special Reference to Sharı¯’ah Law in Northern
Nigeria (1999–2007)’, D. Phil. thesis, University ofWales, 2009.
83 See E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1817), 6; the Latin maxim appears in Coke’s
Third Institute, Chapter 1 (‘High Treason’).
84 James Stephen notes that the authority for this maxim is Coke’s Third Institute, in which it is cited with a
marginal note ‘Regula’ in the course of his account of the Statute of Treasons. Stephen admits that he does not
knowwhere Coke quotes it from; see J. F. Stephen,AHistory of the Criminal Law of England (1883), 94; Pollock
and Maitland traced it correctly back to St Augustine, where the maxim reads ‘Reum non facit nisi mens rea’
and certainly contained no reference to an actus; F. Pollock andW.Maitland, The History of English Law before
the Time of Edward I (1923), 476.
85 M. A. al-Zarqa¯, al-Madkhal al-Fiqhı¯ al-’Amm, Vol. II (1983), 933.
86 Kamali, supra note 8, at 143.
87 Kamali, supra note 4, at 78.
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judge to master a certain level of rules (al-qawa¯’id) in order to be able to dispense
Islamic verdicts and to pass accurate judgment’.88 As Imam al-Qarraﬁ (d. 684 AH)
afﬁrms:
These maxims are signiﬁcant in Islamic jurisprudence. . . . By it, the value of a jurist is
measured. Through it, the beauty of Fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] is shown and known.
With it, the methods of Fatwa [legal verdict or opinion] are clearly understood. . . .
Whoever knows Fiqh with its maxims (qawa¯‘id) shall be in no need of memorizing
most of the subordinate parts [of Fiqh] because of their inclusion under the general
maxims.89
Legal maxims aid judges in comprehending the basic doctrines of Islamic law on
any contentious issue. For instance, the Islamic legal maxim that calls upon judges
to avoid imposing hudu¯d and other sanctions when beset by doubts as to the scope
of the law or the sufﬁciency of the evidence is frequently referenced and applied by
judges of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Court of the United Arab Emirates.90 It has been
noted that ‘exploring this opportunity would also give scholars, judges and jurists
of Islamic law the ability to deliver sound and just legal judgments’.91
It is difﬁcult to trace the precise dates for the emergence of the legal maxims
(al-qawa¯‘id al-ﬁqhı¯yah) as a distinctive genre of roots of Islamic jurisprudence (u¯su¯l
al-ﬁqh). Sufﬁce to say that al-qawa¯‘id al-ﬁqhı¯yah has gone through three stages of
development.92 The ﬁrst stage can be traced back to the seventh century (610–632)
as the Prophet of Islam was endowed with the use of precise yet comprehensive
and inclusive expressions (jawa¯mi’ al-kalim).93 Despite the fact that the term qawa¯’id
(plural of qa’idah) was not explicitly mentioned in the expressions of the Prophet,
the prophetic hadı¯ths are full of expressions of legalmaxims. For instance, the hadı¯th
la¯ darar wala¯ dira¯r (‘let there be no inﬂiction of harm nor its reciprocation’); innama¯
al-a‘ma¯l bil-niyya¯t (‘acts are valued in accordance with their underlying intentions’);
and al-bayyinah ’ala¯ al-mudda’ı¯ wa al-yamı¯n ’ala¯ man ankar (‘the burden of proof is on
the claimant and the oath is on the one who denies’) are a few of those prophetic
hadı¯ths that emerged as Islamic legal maxims.
Thesecondstageatwhichal-qawa¯’idal-ﬁqhı¯yahbegantogainpopularitywasinthe
middle of the fourth century ofHijrah (ninth century AD) and beyondwhen the idea
of imitation (al-taqlı¯d) emerged and the spirit of independent reasoning (ijtiha¯d)94
was on the edge of extinction.95 At this stage, legal maxims became recognized as
a distinct subject from usu¯l al-ﬁqh.96 The ﬁrst visible work on Islamic legal maxims,
88 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 58–9.
89 A. Al-Qaraﬁ, al-Furu¯q, Vol. 1, 3, quoted in Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 59.
90 Appeal No. 36, Penal Judicial Year 5, Session 9/1/1984; Appeal No. 40, Penal Judicial Year 6, Session 18/1/1985;
Appeal No. 32, Penal Judicial Year 13, Session 15/1/1992; Appeal No. 42, Penal Judicial Year 8, Session 1986;
Appeal No. 43, Penal/Shari’a Judicial Year 18, Session 4/5/1996.
91 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 59–60.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., at 38.
94 Ijtiha¯d (independent reasoning) literally means legal methods of interpretation and reasoning by which a
mujtahid derives or rationalizes law on the basis of the Qur’a¯n, the Sunnah, and/or consensus.
95 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 42.
96 Ibid.
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usu¯l al-Karkhı¯, was written by Hanaﬁ’s jurist, Ibn al-Hassan al-Karkhı¯.97 This was
followed by other signiﬁcant contributions by jurists from other madha¯hib (legal
schools), namely the Shafe’i’s, the Hanbali, and theMaliki schools.98
The Islamic legal maxims reach the stage of maturity around the thirteenth
century AH/eighteenth century AD. According to one commentator, ‘one of the dis-
tinctive features of this stage is the establishment ofmaxims as a separate science in
Islamic jurisprudence, while at the same time the formula of their codiﬁcation was
standardized’.99
The Mejell-i Ahkam Adliyye, an Islamic law code written by a group of Turkish
scholars in the late nineteenth century, is said to present themost advanced stage in
the compilation of the Islamic legal maxims.
Islamic legal maxims are divided into two types. The ﬁrst are those that reiterate
theQur’a¯n and theSunnah,whereas the secondare those formulatedby the jurists.100
The former carry greater authority than the latter. The most expansive collection
of legal maxims is known as al-qawa¯’id al-ﬁqhı¯yah al-aslı¯yah or al-qawa¯‘id al-ﬁqhı¯yah
al-kullı¯yah (‘the normative/basic legal maxims’). This kind of maxim stands as the
pillars of usu¯l al-ﬁqh; they could be applied broadly to the entire corpus of Islamic
jurisprudence; each of thesemaximshas supplementarymaximsof amore speciﬁed
scope;andthereisconsensusamongthelegalschoolsoverthem.101Theﬁvegenerally
agreed-upon maxims are as follows: (i) al-umu¯r bi-maqa¯sidha¯ (‘acts are judged by
their goals and purposes’); (ii) al-yaqı¯n la¯ yaza¯lu bil-shak (‘certainty is not overruled
by doubt’); (iii) al-mashaqqatu tajlib al-taysı¯r (‘hardship begets facility’); (iv) al-dararu
yuza¯l (‘harm must be eliminated’); and (v) al-’a¯datu muuhakamatun (‘custom is the
basis of judgment’).
The maxim ‘certainty is not overruled by doubt’ has several sub-maxims, one
of which reads ‘knowledge that is based on certainty is to be differentiated from
manifest knowledge that is basedonprobability’ (yufarraqu bayn al-cilmi idha¯ thabata
zahira¯nwebaynahu idha¯ thabatayaqı¯nan).Twoexamplesare illustrative inthis regard:
When the judge adjudicates on the basis of certainty, but later it appears that hemight
have erred in his judgment, if his initial decision is based on clear text and consensus,
it would not be subjected to review on the basis of a mere probability.102
This maxim also applies where a:
missing person (mafqu¯d) of unknown whereabouts is presumed to be alive, as this is
the certainty that is known about him before his disappearance. The certainty here
shall prevail and no claim of his death would validate distribution of his assets among
97 K. Mohammed, ‘The Islamic Law Maxims’, (2005) 44 Islamic Studies 19, at 196; W. Heinriches, ‘Qawa¯’id as a
Genre of Legal Literature’, inWeiss, supra note 44, at 369.
98 Kamali, supra note 41, at 142–4.
99 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 46.
100 Heinriches, supra note 97, at 364 and 385;Mohammed, supra note 97, at 191–209;M. H. Kamali, ‘Shari’ah and
the Challenge of Modernity’, (1994) 1 Journal of the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, reprinted in
(1995) 2 Islamic University Quarterly.
101 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 55.
102 M. A. Barikati,Qawa¯’id al-Fiqh (1961), 142, quoted in Kamali, supra note 8, at 145 (emphasis added).
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his heirs until his death is proven by clear evidence. A doubtful claim of his death is
thus not allowed to overrule what is deemed to be certain.103
4. PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND NON-RETROACTIVITY
One of the rare provisions set out as a non-derogable norm in all of themajor human
rights instruments is the nullum crimen sine lege rule.104 Article 22 of the ICC Statute
conﬁrms the core prohibition of the retroactive application of the criminal law
together with the other two major corollaries of this prohibition, namely the rule
of strict construction and the requirement of in dubio pro reo.105 The prohibitions
of retroactive offences together with the prohibition of retroactive penalties, nulla
poena sine lege,106 form the ‘principle of legality’.
In Islamic law, there is no place for arbitrary rule by a single individual or a
group.107 In fact, long before the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which, in 1789,
ﬁrst proclaimed the legality principle inWestern law, the Islamic systemof criminal
justice operated on an implicit principle of legality.108 Evidence of this principle can
be found in the followingQur’a¯nic verses:
Nor would We visit with our wrath until we had sent a messenger (to give warning).
(Qur’a¯n, 17:15)
Messenger, who gave good news as well as warning, that mankind, after (the coming)
of the apostles, should have no plea against Allah. For Allah is Exalted in Power,Wise.
(Qur’a¯n, 4:165)
Islamic law includes a number of legal maxims that complement this principle,
such as: ‘the conduct of reasonable men (or the dictate of reason) alone is of no
consequence without the support of a legal text’, whichmeans that no conduct can
be declared forbidden (hara¯m) on the ground of reason alone or on the ground of the
act of reasonable men; rather, a legal text is necessary.109 Another maxim declares
that ‘permissibility is the original norm’ (al-asl, ﬁ’l-ashya¯’ al-iba¯hah), which implies
that all things are permissible unless the lawhas declared themotherwise.110 Shari’a
also establishes the rule of non-retroactivity, unless it is in favour of the accused:111
‘Say to the Unbelievers, if (now) they desist (from Unbelief), their past would be
103 S. M. Zarqa¯, Sharh al-Qawa¯’id al-Fiqhiyyah (1993), 382, in Kamali, supra note 8, at 145.
104 W. A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010), 403, with reference
to universal and regional human rights instruments together with relevant provision (Art. 99) in the third
Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Arts. 2(c) and 6(c) the two
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
and Non-International Armed Conﬂict, respectively.
105 See B. Broomhall, ‘Article 22: Nullum crimen sine lege’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (2008), 714.
106 Art. 23 of the ICC Statute.
107 Kamali, supra note 8, at 180.
108 T. Kamel, ‘The Principle of Legality and Its Application in Islamic Criminal Justice’, in M. C. Bassiouni supra
note 52, at 149–50.
109 Kamali, supra note 8, at 186.
110 Al- Ghaza¯lı¯, a-Mustasfa¯, I, 63; Al-A¯midı¯, al-Ihka¯m, I, 130, in Kamali, supra note 8, at 186.
111 Kamali, supra note 8, at 188.
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forgiven them; but if they persist, the punishment of those before them is already (a
matter of warning for them)’ (Qur’a¯n, 8:38).
Thisprinciple is alsomirrored in the traditionof theProphet.When ’Amrb. al-’Ass
embraced Islam, he pledged allegiance to the Prophet and asked whether he would
be held accountable for his previous transgressions. To this, the Prophet replied:
‘Did you not know, O’Amr, that Islam obliterates that which took place before it?’112
Similarly, the Prophet refrained frompunishing crimes of blood or acts of usury that
had taken place prior to Islam:
Any blood-guilt traced back to the period of ignorance should be disregarded, and I
beginwith that of al-Harith ibn ’Abd al-Muttalib; theusurypractisedduring that period
has also been erased starting with that of my uncle, al-’Abbas ibn ’Abd al-Muttalib.113
Hudu¯dcrimesareﬁrmlybasedontheprincipleof legality,asthecrimesthemselves,as
well as the punishments, are precisely determined in theQur’a¯n or the Sunnah.Qisa¯s
crimes are bound to speciﬁc procedures and appropriate penalties in the process
of retribution and compensation and thus also show their basis in the principle of
legality.114 More problematic are ta’azir crimes, which, according to some schools of
thought, give very broad discretionary powers to the khalifa (ruler) and to the qadi
(judge) regarding what they punish and how.115 While ta’azir crimes are, for that
reason, viewed by Western scholars as clearly violating the principle of legality,116
Muslim scholars have mostly defended the wide discretion given to the judges,
claiming that this is merely a safeguard that serves to balance the principle of
legality and thus avoid the problem of its potential inﬂexibility.117
The conclusion of this author is that there is nothing in the primary sources
that would allow for ta’azir crimes to be exempt from the principle of legality.118
Furthermore, to arbitrarily punish under ta’azir those hudu¯d offences that do not
meet their procedural requirements amounts to nothing more than an attempt to
circumvent the Shari’a rule.
5. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The provision on presumption of innocence as enshrined in Article 66 of the ICC
Statute is threefold and its mechanics have been best illustrated by the European
Court of Human Rights in Barbera´ v. Spain:
It requires, inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, (1) the members of a court
shouldnot startwith thepreconceived idea that the accusedhas committed theoffence
112 Muslim, Sahı¯h Muslim, Kita¯b al-Ima¯n, Ba¯b al-Isla¯m yahdim ma¯ qablah wa kadha¯ al-hijrah wa al-hajj; Abu¯
Zahrah, al-Jarı¯mah, 343, in Kamali, supra note 8, at 188.
113 Kamel, supra note 108, at 159.
114 Ibid., at 161.
115 S. Tellenbach, ‘Fair Trial Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings under Islamic, Afghan Constitutional and
International Law’, (2004), available at www.zaoerv.de/64_2004/64_2004_4_a_929_942.pdf.
116 Kamel, supra note 108, at 157.
117 Ibid., at 151; M. S. El-Awa, supra note 31; Benmelha, supra note 64, at 213.
118 See also Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 56.
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charged; (2) the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and (3) any doubt should beneﬁt
the accused.119
Under Islamic law, no one is guilty of a crime unless his guilt is proved through
lawful evidence.120 One of the sub-maxims of themaxim ‘certainty is not overruled
by doubt’ is the maxim that reads: ‘The norm [of Sharı¯’ah] is that of non-liability’
(al-aslu bara¯’at al-dhimmah). The Prophet is reported to have said ‘everyone is born
inherently pure’.121 According to the legal principle of istishaˆb, recognized by the
Shaﬁ’i and Hanbali schools, there is a presumption of continuation of a certain
state, until the contrary is established by evidence.122 Therefore, an accused person
is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In the words of Kamali, ‘to
attribute guilt to anyone is treated as doubtful. Certainty can . . . only be overruled
by certainty, not by doubt’.123 The Prophet is reported to have said:
The burden of proof is on him who makes the claim, whereas the oath [denying the
charge] is on himwho denies;124
Had Men been believed only according to their allegations, some persons would have
claimed the blood and properties belonging to others, but the accuser is bound to
present positive proof;125
and
Avoid condemning the Muslim to hudu¯d whenever you can, and when you can ﬁnd a
way out for theMuslim then release him for it. If the Imam errs, it is better that he errs
in favour of innocence (pardon) than in favour of guilt (punishment).126
From the latter, hadith jurists have derived the general principle and it is agreed
by the four major Sunni schools that doubt (shubhah) also fends off qisa¯s.127 The
following case is illustrative in this regard:
During the time of theMuslim polity’s fourth caliph ’Alı¯, Medina’s patrol found aman
in the town ruins with a blood-stained knife in hand, standing over the corpse of a
manwhohad recently been stabbed to death.When they arrestedhim, he immediately
confessed: ‘I killed him.’ He was brought before ’Alı¯, who sentenced him to death for
the deed. Before the sentencewas carried out, anothermanhurried forward, telling the
executioners not to be hasty. ‘Do not kill him. I did it,’ he announced. ’Alı¯ turned to the
condemnedman, incredulously. ‘Whatmade you confess to amurder that you did not
commit?!’ he asked. Theman explained that he thought that ’Alı¯ would never take his
word over that of the patrolmen who had witnessed a crime scene, he was a butcher
who had just ﬁnished slaughtering a cow. Immediately afterward, he needed to relieve
himself, so entered into the area of the ruins, bloodyknife still in hand.Upon return, he
119 Barbera´,Messegue´ and Jabardo v. Spain, (1988) SeriesANo. 146, para. 77, quotedbyW.A. Schabas, ‘Presumption
of Innocence’, in Triffterer, supra note 105, at 1236 (numbers added).
120 Abu¯ Yu¯suf, Kita¯b al-Khara¯j, 152, in Kamali, supra note 8, at 181.
121 Baderin, supra note 23, at 103.
122 M. H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (2003), 384.
123 Kamali, supra note 8, at 145–6.
124 Al-Bayhaqı¯, al-Sunan al-Kubra¯, Kita¯b al-Da’wa¯ wa al-Bayyina¯t, Ba¯b al-Bayyinah ‘ala¯ al-Mudda’a¯ wa al-Yam n
’ala¯ al-Mudda’a¯ ’alayh’, in Kamali, supra note 8, at 182.
125 Al Baihagi, ‘The 40 Hadith of Imam al Nawawi, No. 33’, in Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 40.
126 Al Turmuzy, No. 1424; Al Baihagi, No. 8/338; Al Hakim, No. 4384, in Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 40.
127 S. S. S. Haneef,Homicide in Islam (2000), 120.
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came across the dead man, and stood over him in concern. It was then that the petrol
arrested him. He ﬁgured that he could not plausibly deny having committed the crime
ofmurder. He surrendered himself and confessed to the ‘obvious,’ deciding to leave the
truth of the matter in God’s hands. The second man offered a corroborating story. He
explained that he was the one who had murdered for money and ﬂed when he heard
the sounds of the patrol approaching. On his way out, he passed the butcher on the
way in andwatched the events previously described unfold. But once the ﬁrstmanwas
condemned to death, the second man said that he had to step forward, because he did
not want the blood of twomen on his hands.128
Having realized that the facts surrounding the above case had become doubtful
without a fail-safe means to validate one story over the other, the fourth caliph ’Alı¯
released the ﬁrst man and pardoned the second.129
The system of proof applicable for hudu¯d and qisa¯s makes it very difﬁcult and
sometimes almost impossible to prove a crime.130 On this matter, theQur’a¯n states:
‘And those who launch a charge against chaste women and produce not four wit-
nesses (to support their allegation) ﬂog them with eighty stripes and reject their
evidence ever after, for suchmen are wicked transgressors’ (Qur’a¯n, 24:4).
6. MENS REA
For the ﬁrst time in the sphere of international criminal law, and unlike the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo Charters or the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals,
Article 30of theRomeStatuteof the InternationalCriminalCourtprovides ageneral
deﬁnition for the mental element required to trigger the criminal responsibility of
individuals for serious violations of international humanitarian law. This provision
is in line with the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. But Article 30
goes still further, assuring that the mental element consists of two components: a
volitional component of intent and a cognitive element of knowledge.131
In Shari’a, one of the basic legal maxims agreed upon by Muslim scholars is
al-umu¯r bi maqa¯sidiha¯, which implies that any action, whether physical or verbal,
should be considered and judged according to the intention of the doer.132 The ﬁrst
element of themaxim, umu¯r (plural for amr), is literally translated as amatter, issue,
act, physical or verbal.133 The second word is al-maqa¯sid (plural of maqsad), which
literally means willing, the determination to do something for a purpose.134 Thus,
for an act to be punishable, the intention of the perpetrator has to be established.
Evidence of this maxim can be found in the Qur’a¯n and the Sunnah: ‘That man can
have nothing butwhat he strives for’ (Qur’a¯n, 53:39); ‘But there is no blame on you if
ye make a mistake therein: (what counts is) the intention of your hearts and Allah
128 Quoted in I. A. Rabb, ‘Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: Hudu¯d – Avoidance in
Cases of Doubt’, (2010) 17Arab Law Quarterly 63, at 64–5.
129 Ibid., at 66.
130 Tellenbach, supra note 115, at 930.
131 SeeM.E.Badar, ‘TheMentalElement in theRomeStatuteof the InternationalCriminalCourt:ACommentary
from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective’, (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 473.
132 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 64.
133 Ibid., at 64.
134 Ibid., at 65.
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is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful’ (Qur’a¯n, 33:5). This stand is further afﬁrmed by the
Sunnah of the Prophet:
Actions are to be judged by the intention behind them and everybody shall have what
he intends;135
Verily, Allah has formy Sake overlooked the unintentionalmistakes and forgetfulness
of myUmmah (community) and what they are forced to do;136
and
Unintentional mistakes and forgetfulness of my Ummah (community) are
overlooked.137
Yet, the general rule in Shari’a is that a man cannot be held responsible for a mere
thought. In Islam, a good thought is recorded as an act of piety and a bad thought
is not recorded at all.138 According to Imam Abou Zahra, an eminent scholar, the
criminal intent is the intent to act wilfully, premeditatedly, and deliberately, with a
complete consent about its intended results.139 Intentional crimes must meet three
conditions: premeditation, a free will to choose a certain course of action, and the
knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act.140 The difference between intentional
and unintentional results is in the degree of punishment.
The established jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court of the United Arab
of Emirates (UAE) recognizes different degrees ofmental states other than the one of
actual intent.Most notably, theUAE adheres toMalik’s school of thought, according
to which, in murder cases, it is not a condition sine qua non to prove the intent of
murder on the part of the defendant; it is sufﬁcient, however, to prove that the act
was carried out with purpose of assault and not for the purpose of amusement or
discipline. A practical example is set forth in one of Malik’s jurisprudence sources:
‘if two people fought intentionally and one of them was killed, retaliation (qı¯sas)
should be imposed on the person who survived.’141
6.1. Standards used for determining intention inmurder cases
Because the intention of a person is difﬁcult to determine, Muslim jurists do not
envisage an exploration of the psyche of the killer, or any extensive examination
of behaviour patterns or the gradation of the relationship between the killer and
the victim.142 Instead, they consider the objects used in the crimes described by the
relative hadı¯ths as external standards that are likely to convey the inner working
of the offender’s mind and thus distinguish between ’amd (intentional) and shibh
al-’amd (quasi-intentional).143
135 Al-Bukhari, Sahih, hadı¯th no. 1, Muslim, Sahih, hadı¯th no. 1599.
136 Sahih al-Bukhari; Vol. 9, at 65, quoted in Y. Y. Bambale, Crimes and Punishment in Islamic Law (2003), 7.
137 Ibid.
138 A. O. Naseef, Encyclopedia of Seerah (1982), 741, in Bambale, supra note 136, at 6.
139 M. Abu-Zahra,Al-JarimaWal-Uquba ﬁl Islam (Crime and Punishment in Islam) (1998), 396.
140 Ibid., at 106.
141 Supreme Federal Court of the UAE, Appeal 52, judicial year 14, hearing 30 January 1993.
142 P. R. Powers, ‘OffendingHeaven and Earth: Sin and Expiation in IslamicHomicide Law’, (2007) 14 Islamic Law
and Society 42.
143 Nyazee, supra note 55, at 98.
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In drawing analogies from relevant hadı¯ths, the majority of Muslim scholars
concludedthat themensreaofmurder is foundwhentheoffenderusesan instrument
that is most likely to cause death or is prepared for killing, such as a sword, a spear,
a ﬂint, or a ﬁre.144 Abu Hanifa excluded all blunt instruments, such as a wooden
club, from the list of lethal weapons and claimed they testify to quasi-intention,
irrespective of the size of the instrument or the force applied.145 However, he does
not exclude an iron rod, relying on the words of the Qur’a¯n: ‘We sent down Iron, in
which is (material for) mighty war’ (Qur’a¯n, 57:25).146
However,Hanifa’sdisciples, ImamAbuYusufandImamMuhammadal-Shaybani,
rebuttedhis arguments, saying that the stone and stickmentioned in the hadı¯th refer
to a stone and stick that, in the ordinary course, do not cause death, not just any
stone or stick.147 This is also the opinion of the majority of jurists.148
The overall balance between using subjective and objective criteria in determin-
ing intent thus tips decidedly in favour of reliance on objective evidence,149 which
seemingly becomes a constituent element of the crime in itself, replacing the ac-
tual intent. Accordingly, Hanaﬁ Ibn Mawdud al-Musili deﬁnes intentional killing
as ‘deliberately striking with that which splits into parts, such as a sword, a spear,
a ﬂint, and ﬁre’,150 and Hanbali Ibn Qudama deems intentional any homicide com-
mitted with an instrument ‘thought likely to cause death when used in its usual
manner’.151
7. DURESS AND SUPERIOR ORDERS
The ICC Statute recognizes two forms of duress as grounds for excluding criminal
responsibility, namely duress152 and duress of circumstances.153 The latter form is
treated by English courts as a defence of necessity.154 The elements of the two forms
arealmost identical.Unlike the jurisprudenceof the ICTY, the ICCallows thedefence
of duress to murder that runs contrary to Islamic law (Shari’a), as will be discussed
later in this section.
In international criminal law, the defence of superior orders is often confounded
with that of duress, but the two are quite distinct. For superior orders to be a valid
defence before the ICC, three conditions have to be established: the defendantmust
beunderalegalobligationtoobeyordersofagovernmentorasuperior; thedefendant
144 Haneef, supra note 127, at 1.
145 Nyazee, supra note 55, at 99; Haneef, supra note 127, at 35.
146 Nyazee, supra note 55, at 99.
147 Al-Tahawi, SharihMa’ani al-Athar, Vol. 3, 186, quoted in Haneef, supra note 127, at 36.
148 Haneef, supra note 127, at 36.
149 Powers, supra note 142, at 48; Peters, supra note 21, at 43.
150 Powers, supra note 142, at 42 and 48.
151 Ibid., at 49.
152 Art. 31(1)(d)(i) of the ICC Statute.
153 Art. 31(1)(d)(ii) of the ICC Statute.
154 See R. v. Conway, [1988] 3 All ER 1025, Court of Appeal, Criminal Division; R. v. Martin, [1989] 1 All ER 652,
Court of Appeal, Criminal Division.
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must not know that the order was unlawful; and the order must not be manifestly
unlawful.155
In Islamic law, duress (ikra¯h) is a situation inwhich a person is forced to do some-
thing against his will.156 The Qur’a¯n acknowledges such a situation and prescribes
thus: ‘Save him who is forced thereto and whose heart is still content with Faith’
(Qur’a¯n, 16:106). The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘My Ummah will be forgiven
for crimes it commits under duress, in error, or as a result of forgetfulness.’157
Under duress, the person commits a criminal act not as an end in itself, but as a
means to save himself from being injured. If the threat concerns persons other than
the person under compulsion, the Maliki consider it duress, some Hanaﬁs do not,
while the Shafe’i and other Hanaﬁs believe it to be duress only if the threat relates
to the father, son or other close relative.158
Islamic law recognizes two kinds of duress:
1. Duress imperfect – a kind of duress that does not pose a threat to the life of the
agent. For example, the (threat of) conﬁnement for a certain period or subjecting
the agent to physical violence that does not pose a threat to his life. This kind of
duress has no force in crimes.159
2. Duressproper–akindofduress inwhichthelifeof theagent is threatened.Boththe
consent and the choice of the agent are neutralized. Under duress proper, certain
forbidden acts will not only cease to be punishable, but will become permissible.
These relate to forbidden edibles and drinks. Other acts, such as false accusation,
vituperation, larceny, and destroying property of another, will remain unlawful,
but punishment will be invalidated.160 However, murder or any fatal offence are
unaffected by duress and will not become either permissible acts, or subject to
lenient penalty.161
In the latter situationof duress, Shari’adisapproves of both courses of action that the
person under duress can choose from. It prohibits doing harm to others as well as
endangering one’s own safety. In this situation, two legal maxims apply: ‘one harm
should not be warded off by its like (another harm)’ and, when this is inevitable,
one should ‘prefer the lesser evil’.162 Therefore, if a person has to choose between
causing mild physical harm or being killed and he chooses the former, his action is
justiﬁed.163 In the case ofmurder, however, both evils are equal, as no person’s life is
more precious than another’s.164
The issue of punishment in the case of murder is disputed. Most Islamic scholars
agree that there must be retribution (qisa¯s); however, some prescribe only blood
155 Art. 33 of the ICC Statute.
156 Nyazee, supra note 55, at 144.
157 IbnMajah, al-Sunan, op. cit. hadı¯th no. 2045, in Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 73.
158 Peters, supra note 21, at 23.
159 A. Q. Oudah, Criminal Law of Islam, Vol. 2 (2005), 293.
160 Ibid., at 300–3.
161 Ibid., at 298.
162 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 178–83.
163 Abu-Zahra, supra note 139, at 379.
164 Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 73; Oudah, supra note 159, at 306.
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money (diyat) on the ground that duress introduces an element of doubt.165 Within
Hanifa’s school, there are three different opinions:
1. qisa¯smust be borne by the forced person, for it is he who actually carried out the
criminal act;
2. neither the person who inﬂicts duress nor the person under duress shall be pun-
ished by qisa¯s, as the person who inﬂicts duress is merely an inciter, while the
person under duress, neither has the criminal intent, nor is he satisﬁed with
the result of the act and only blood money should be paid by the person who
compels;166
3. qisa¯s should be borne by the person who inﬂicts, as the person under duress is
just a puppet or a tool of murder at the hands of the one who threatens him. For a
person it is lesser evil to choose the death of another than his own. This does not
mean however that he will be blameless in the next world, because his sin shall
be forgiven by God on the day of judgement.167
In so far as thedefenceof superiororders is concerned, ‘Islamconfersonevery citizen
the right to refuse to commit a crime, should any government or administrator
order him to do so’.168 The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘There is no obedience
in transgression; obedience is in lawful conduct only;’169 ‘There is no obedience to a
creature when it involves the disobedience of the Creator.’170 The order of a compe-
tent authority that implies punishment of death, grievous injury, or imprisonment
for the disobedient will be treated as duress.171 However, if the order is given by an
ofﬁcial who does not have the necessary powers, it will only be treated as duress
if the person under his command is sure that if he fails to carry out the order, the
means of duress will be applied to him or that the ofﬁcial in question is in the habit
of applying suchmeasures when his orders are deﬁed.172 In other cases, no offender
may seek to escape punishment by saying that the offence was committed on the
orders of a superior; if such a situation arises, the person who commits the offence
and the person who orders it are equally liable.173
8. RULERS ARE NOT ABOVE THE LAW (IRRELEVANCE OF OFFICIAL
CAPACITY/IMMUNITY)
Similarly to Article 27 of the ICC Statute (irrelevance of ofﬁcial capacity), in Is-
lamic law, there is no recognition of special privileges for anyone and rulers are
not above the law. Muslim jurists have unanimously held the view that the head
165 Peters, supra note 21, at 24; Zakariyah, supra note 82, at 151–2.
166 Abu-Zahra, supra note 139, at 382; Oudah, supra note 159, at 299.
167 Abu-Zahra, supra note 139, at 382.
168 A. A. Mawdu¯dı¯,Human Rights in Islam (1980), 33.
169 Sahı¯hMuslim,Kita¯bal-Ama¯nah,Ba¯bWuju¯bTa¯’atal-Umara¯’ﬁGhayral-Ma’siyahwaTahrı¯muha¯ﬁ’l-Ma’’siyah,
hadı¯th no. 39. This hadı¯th is reported in both Bukha¯ri andMuslim.
170 Abu¯ Da¯wu¯d al-Sijista¯nı¯, Sunan Abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, tr. Ahmad Hasan, hadı¯th no. 2285.
171 Oudah, supra note 159, at 295.
172 Hasia Ibn Abideen, Vol. 5, at 112, in ibid.
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of state and government ofﬁcials are accountable for their conduct like everyone
else.174 Equality before the law and before the courts of justice is clearly recognized
for all citizens alike, from the most humble citizen to the highest executive in
the land.175 A tradition was reported by Caliph Umar showing how the Prophet
himself did not expect any special treatment: ‘On the occasion of the battle of
Badr, when the Prophet was straightening the rows of the Muslim army, he hit
the stomach of a soldier in an attempt to push him back in line. The soldier com-
plained: “O Prophet, you have hurt me with your stick.” The Prophet immediately
bared his stomach and said, “I am very sorry, you can revenge by doing the same
to me.”’176 When a woman from a noble family was brought before the Prophet
in connection with a theft and it was recommended that she be spared punish-
ment, the Prophet made his stance on the equality of everyone before the law even
clearer:
The nations that lived before you were destroyed by God, because they punished
the common man for their offences and let their dignitaries go unpunished for their
crimes; I swear by Him (God) who holds my life in His hand that even if Fatima, the
daughter ofMuhammad, had committed this crime, then I would have amputated her
hand.177
9. GENERAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSION
Islamic law has developed over many centuries of juristic effort into a subtle, com-
plex, and highly developed reality. Such a complexity does not, however, make
Islamic law indeterminable.178 The differences between the jurists and schools of
Islamic jurisprudence represent ‘different manifestations of the same divine will’
and are considered as ‘diversity within unity’.179 ‘Islamic law, like any other, has its
“sources” (al-masadir); it also has its “guiding principles” (al-usul) that dictate the
nature of its “evidence” (al-adilla); it equally employs the use of “legal maxims” (al-
qawa’id) and utilizes a number of underlying “objectives” (al-maqasid) to underpin
the structure of its legal theory.’180
This study shows that Islamic legal maxims, themajority of which are universal,
play a vital role in the process of judgment. Thus, the ‘presumption of innocence’,
the most fundamental rights of the accused as enshrined in Article 66 of the ICC
Statute, ﬁnds its counterpart in the Islamic legal maxim ‘certainty is not overruled
by doubt’ and its sub-maxim ‘the norm of [Shari’a] is that of non liability’ – a very
174 Kamali, supra note 8, at 180.
175 Mawdu¯dı¯, supranote168, at32; cf.AbuZahrah,Tanzı¯m,34–5;Mutawallı¯,Maba¯dı¯, 387;Ghaza¯wı¯, al-Hurriyyah,
26, in Kamali, supra note 8, at 181.
176 Mawdu¯dı¯, supra note 168, at 32.
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178 Baderin, supra note 23, at 32–3.
179 M. H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1991), 169.
180 G. Picken, Islamic Law, 4 vols. (2010).
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explicit rule that obligates judges not to start the trial with the preconceived idea
that the accused has committed the offence charged.
The second paragraph of Article 66 of the ICC Statute, which stipulates that the
burden of proof is on the prosecution, is equivalent to the hadı¯th of the Prophet that
states: ‘Theburdenofproofisonhimwhomakestheclaim,whereastheoath[denying
the charge] is on him who denies.’ But the practice of the ICC says otherwise. Our
examinationof the lawofmens rea reveals that there are exceptions regarding the ap-
plication of the default rule of intent and knowledge to the crimeswithin the ratione
materiae of the ICC. The Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) has afﬁrmed that the ICC
Elements of Crimes can by themselves ‘provide otherwise’. The PTC considered that
the fault element of negligence, as set out in theElements ofCrimes for particular of-
fences, canbe anexception to the intent andknowledge standardprovided inArticle
30(1) of the ICCStatute.181 In such situations,where conviction depends uponproof
that the perpetrator had ‘reasonable cause’ to believe or suspect some relevant fact,
the prosecution does not havemuch to do and the burden of proof, arguably, will lie
upon the defendant – a practice that apparently conﬂictswith the above-mentioned
hadı¯th.
As far as the mens rea is concerned, the exclusion of recklessness as a culpable
mental element within the meaning of Article 30 of the ICC runs in harmony with
the basic principles of Islamic law that no one shall be held criminally respons-
ible for hudu¯d crimes (offences with ﬁxed mandatory punishments) or qisa¯s crimes
(retaliation) unless he or she has wilfully or intentionally (’amda¯n) committed the
crime at issue.
The approach followed by Muslim jurists in determining the existence of mens
rea in murder cases warrants further consideration. They consider the objects used
in committing the crime in question as external factors that are likely to convey the
defendant’s mental state.
Both systems collided regarding the validity of duress as a general defence to
murder. Unlike the ICC Statute, which allows such defence, Islamic jurisprudence
has a ﬁrm stand on this point, as no person’s life is more precious than another’s.
This position is based on the Islamic legal maxim ‘one harm should not be warded
off by its like (another)’.
Based on this preliminary study and other scholarly works,182 there is no reason
for the Islamic legal system, which is recognized by such a considerable part of the
181 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, De´cision sur la conﬁrmation des charges, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803,
29 January 2007, paras. 356–359.
182 M. C. Bassiouni, Islamic Criminal Justice (1982); M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law’,
(1980) 74 AJIL 609; M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-Defense to Revolutionary and
Regime-Change Political Violence’, (2007) 8 Chicago JIL 119; M. C. Bassiouni and A. Guellali (eds.), Jihad and
Its Challenges to International andDomestic Law (2010);M. E. El Zeidy and R.Murphy, ‘Islamic Law on Prisoners
ofWar and Its Relationship with International Humanitarian Law’, (2004) 14 Italian Yearbook of International
Law 53; F.Malekian, ‘TheHomogenity of ICCwith Islamic Jurisprudence’, (2009) 9 International Criminal Law
Review 595; A.Maged, ‘Arab and Islamic Shari’a Perspectives on theCurrent Systemof International Criminal
Court’, (2008) 8 International Criminal Law Review 477; S. C. Roach, ‘Arab States and the Role of Islam in the
International Criminal Court’, (2005) 53 Political Studies 143.
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world, not to be included in comparative studies to reveal to the international judge
a more complete picture of legal systems from which he or she is to derive general
principles of law. As Rudolph Schlesinger put it: ‘The time has come, perhaps, to
discard or limit the visionary goal of “one law” or “one code” for the whole world
and to substitute for it themore realistic aim of crystallizing a common core of legal
principles.’183
183 Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 741; Ambos has noted that a purelyWestern approach must be complemented
by non-Western concepts of crime and punishment, such as Islamic law, to establish and develop a universal
system; see K. Ambos, ‘International Criminal Law at the Crossroads: From Ad Hoc Imposition to a Treaty-
Based Universal System’, in C. Stahn and L. Van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspective on International Criminal
Justice (2010), 161, at 177.
